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ABSTRACT
Studies of public/private sector wage differentials typically assume
that the govenment and union status of a worker areexogenous variables.
Recently, some studies have relaxed this assumption slightly by allowing the
union status to be endogenous. In this paper, we consider a more general
selection model in which a worker selects among four labor markets:
private/nonunion, private/union, public/nonunion and public/union. A
multinomial logit model is estimated to capture this selection decision.
Consistent wage equation estimates are then derived using a generalization
of the now familiar two-step estimation procedure. Some evidence is found
for selection bias in the private/nonunion and the public/union sectors.
The pattern of these selection effects produces larger unionwage premiums
in the public as compared to the private sector. While this is in contrast
to the standard findings, the standard errors on the public sector union
wage differentials are quite high. In addition, the data indicates that the
public/private sector wage differential is largest for federal workers
despite the 'tcomparability" process determining their wages.
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Finance Department Department of Economics
Wharton School Yale University
University of Pennsylvania New Haven, CT 06520
Philadelphia, PA 19104I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the public sector has experienced both a
rapid increase in employment as well as a growing rate of unionization. These
developments have focused attention on comparisons between public and private
sector labor markets. In this paper we consider three such comparisons.
First we examine whether public sector unions have been as successful as
private sector unions at generating wage differentials for their members.
Second, we examine the level of wages paid in the public and private sector.
This comparison is motivated by the fact that federal wages are intended to be
set equal to that for "comparable" work in the private sector. We will
present evidence both on the size of the public/private sector wage
differential for federal workers as well as the magnitude of the differentials
for state and local government workers. The final comparison we make between
public and private sector labor markets is the differential impact of sex and
race on wages. Affirmative action legislation might be expected to have a
more significant impact in the public sector. A simple test of this can be
carried out by examining the coefficients on sex and race dummy variables in
both public and private sector wage equations.
We believe that this study has two basic features which make it better
suited than much of the existing literature for making the above comparisons.1
Nearly all of the recent studies of private sector union wage differentials
have been carried out on cross-section or panel data sets of individual
workers. In contrast, most of the work on public sector union wage
differentials has focused on specific categories of government workers, i.e.
public school teachers, and is based on comparisons of union and nonunion—2—
contracts. While each methodology has its merits, comparisons between private
and public sector union differentials should be carried out with a consistent
method of estimation. In this paper, we estimate both types of union
differentials using micro data on individual workers.
The second important feature of this study is its handling of potential
selection bias due to the endogeneity of both the government and the union
status of a worker. Most public sector wage studies using micro data on
individual workers control for the government and union status of a worker by
including a set of dummy variables for the level of government and a dummy
variable for union coverage.2 Two potential problems exist from this
practice. First it assumes that the returns to individual characteristics
such as education and experience are the same regardless of government and
union status. In fact, these returns may differ significantly by the worker's
status. Secondly, individuals choose which of these labor markets to
participate in. This raises the possibility of significant selection bias in
the coefficients of the wage equations. These problems are handled in this
study by estimating four separate wage equations: private/nonunion,
private/union, public/nonunion, and public/union. A multinomial logit
selection model is estimated in an attempt to correct for any existing
selection bias.
Our basic findings can be summarized as follows. Evidence of
self-selection was found for the private/nonunion and the public/union labor
markets. Workers selecting the private/nonunion sector show indications of
having a comparative advantage in that sector. On average, their wages exceed
what would be predicted based on their observed characteristics by 4.5-3-
percent. In contrast, workers selecting the public/union sector show evidence
of having a comparative disadvantage in that sector. Theirwages fall short
of what would be predicted based on their observed characteristicsby 17.1
percent. While the magnitude of the latter selection effect is quite large,
it is subject to large sampling error.
We report both "conditional" and "unconditional" estimates for eachwage
differential of interest. Both are based on the consistentwage equation
coefficient estimates. The unconditional differentials do not include the
selection terms when calculating expected wages. The conditional differen-
tials do include average values for the selection terms in the expectedwage
estimates. Due to the specific nature of the self-selection which exists in
two of the four labor markets, these two different types ofwage differentials
give sharply contrasting results.
The unconditional estimates indicate that public sector unions have
increased wages significantly more than unions in the private sector. The
aggregate public sector unconditional union wage differential is 31.18 per-
cent. The private sector counterpart is only 18.56 percent. In contrast,
the conditional estimates indicate a much lower public sector unionwage
differential as compared to the private sector. The public and private
conditional union wage differential estimates are 3.68 percent and 14.18
percent respectively.
The unconditional and conditional public/private sectorwage differen-
tials provide a similar contrasting view. The aggregate unconditional
public/private sector wage differential is 16.31 percent whereas the
conditional estimate is only 3.80 percent. Despite the comparabilityprocess-4—
which sets federal wages, the public/private sector wage differentials are
largest for this level of government. The unconditional aggregate federal
differential is 28.92 percent. The corresponding state and local figures are
9.45 percent and 18.12 percent. The conditional federal differential is 18.84
percent while the conditional state and local differentials are
insignificantly different from zero.
Finally, we find some evidence consistent with the view that affirmative
action has had a stronger impact in the public sector. The coefficient
estimate on the race dummy variable is insignificant in the public/nonunion
sector and indicates that whites are paid on average 8.14 percent more in the
public/union sector.3 The coefficient estimates for the private sector
indicate that whites are paid on average 13.36 percent more in the private/
nonunion sector and 11.25 percent more in the private/union sector. As a
consequence, the unconditional public/pt ivate sector wage differential is
28.48 percent for non-whites as compared to 13.44 percent for whites.
In the next section we provide a short summary of the empirical
literature on both public sector union wage differentials as well as public/
private sector wage differentials. In section three we outline the
econometric methods used to analyze the data. The construction of the data as
well as the empirical findings are presented in the fourth section. A short
conclusion summarizes our findings and briefly mentions the directions of our
future work on this topic.—5-
II. REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
While unions have a long history in the private sector, they only
recently made their debut in the public sector. In 1962, President Kennedy
signed executive order 1098 which legitimized collective bargaining in the
federal sector for the first time. Federal workers were given the right to
join unions and to bargain over working conditions but not wages. A major
exception to the constraint against wage bargaining was provided to the Postal
workers and employees of federal government authorities i.e. Tennessee Valley
Authority.4 In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to allow collective
bargaining for its public sector workers. By the late 1970's most of the
industrialized states had also adopted such statutes.5 This change in
legislative climate toward public sector unions resulted in a rapid
acceleration in their growth. From 1964 to 1978, the fraction of federal
workers unionized increased from 38.2 percent to 50.2 percent. Over the same
time period, the fraction of state and local government (SLG) workers
unionized increased from 7.7 percent to 17.4 percent.6
Unions representing federal workers typically can not use the bargaining
process to generate higher wages for their members. However, they can lobby
for wage increases through the political process. In 1962, the Federal Salary
Reform Act was signed which established the "comparability" doctrine for
workers covered under the General Service (GS) pay system.7 The wage assigned
to a particular job is supposed to reflect the pay rate for comparable work in
the private sector. This was intended to provide equitible compensation for
federal workers and to allow the federal government to compete with private—6-
companies for employees.8 Each year the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
makes recommendations for pay raises which will maintain this comparability.
In nine out of the last thirteen years these suggested pay raises have been
altered by through the political process prior to adoption.9
The bargaining environment varies across states and localities depending
on the specific legislation governing public sector unions. State laws vary
with respect to whether unions can bargain over wages, if strikes are allowed,
if arbitration is used to settle impasses, what form of arbitration is used,
whether union shops are allowed, etc. Most studies of union wage effects at
the state and local level have concentrated on controling for this variation
in the bargaining environment.10
As was mentioned earlier, very few micro studies have been carried out
which analyze public sector union wage effects. Baugh and Stone (1982) use
Current Population Survey (CPS) data to examine union effects for public
school teachers. They find that union membership is associated with increases
in annual earnings in the range of 0 to 7 percent. The effect of union
membership or membership in an employee association is 12-22 percent. Moore
and Raisian (1981) examine noneducation public employees from the CPS and find
a union effect of 0 to 18 percent for hourly wages.
Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983) survey aggregate studies, contract studies,
and micro studies of public sector union wage effects. They conclude the
following.
"What is most striking is how small these numbers are! The estimated
relative wage differentials associated with union membership or COl-
lective bargaining coverage are typically smaller than 10 percent and
rarely exceed 20 percent. These estimates are consistently lower than
the estimates obtained from private sector studies and they suggest that
the relative wage effects of unions have been less in the public sector
than in the private sector." (p.10)—7—
Much of the work on public/private sector wage differentials has been
carried out by Sharon Smith. We will focus on her 1981 study since ituses
data very similar to our own. Smith analyzes individuals from theMay 1978
CPS who live in one of 39 selected SMSA's. She focused on these SMSA's since
this allowed her to include a metropolitan cost-of--living index calculatedby
the BLS. Separate equations were estimated using OLS for males and females.
Dummy variables were included for union status and for federal, state, and
local government status. She reports both nominal and realwage differentials
and finds little difference between them.
While the federal comparability legislation covers jobs and not
individuals, one might speculate that this legislation would result in smaller
federal public/private wage differentials as compared to the differentialsat
the state and local levels. Smith finds the opposite to be true. The overall
real wage differentials by level of government are given below.11




Looking at Smith's estimates for females, we find that the public/private
sector wage differential declines as we move from the federal to the state and
local levels of government. These figures also show that the federal
differential for females is double the male differential. In addition, Smith
finds large regional variations in these estimated differentials. Federal
differentials for females range from a high of 35 percent in the northeast to-8-
a low of 16 percent in the west. In contrast, local female differentials are
highest in the west (8.]. percent) and lowest in the northeast (0.8 percent).
Finally, since Smith did not interact her union status dummy variable with her
government dummy variables, it is impossible to compare public and private
sector union wage differentials.
III. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
In this section we provide the details of the twostage estimation
procedure used in our analysis. We start with the assumption that there are
four distinct labor markets delineated by their government and union status:
private/nonunion, private/union, public/nonunion, and public/union. The
"potential" wage for the ith worker in the population in each of these labor






mw13 = +u.3 public/nonunion sector
mw14 =X1+u1 public/union sector
where
u. -N(0,a) i =
13 j=1,2,3,4
The data vectors are indexed by the type of labor market since the private
sector equations will contain industry dummy variables while the public sector
equations will contain government classification dummy variables. This
formulation allows for the potential returns for individual characteristics to
vary across each labor market. This is the same as including complete sets of-9-.
interaction terms between union and government status and theremaining
variables in a single wage equation.
Individuals are assumed to select which labor market to participate inby
choosing the market which maximizes lifetime expected utility. The ith
individual's expected lifetime utility from participating in aparticular market
is modeled by the following function.
(2) I'. =Z.y.+ri.. i =
j = 1,2,3,4
A few comments are in order concerning the structure of these functions.
In the bivariate probit selection models used to estimate unionwage
differentials it has become customary to make the market choice decision
depend in part on the contemporaneous union wage differential.12 This leads to
a reduced form probit which is used to correct for selectivity as well as a
structural probit which includes the estimated union wage differential for
each individual as a regressor.
We have not followed this tradition for two reasons. First, potential
long term participation decisions may not be significantly influenced by
contemporaneous wage comparisons. Second, this formulation requires that any
variable thought to influence either wage should be included in the market
choice decision. This leads to cases of possible spurious correlations
entering into the analysis. For example, the percentage of workers unionized
in an industry has been found to affect union and nonunionwage rates in that
industry. Consequently, this variable is included in the reduced form probit
by way of the wage differential term. However, as this variable approaches-10-
either zero or one hundred percent, you can predict the individual's market
choice decision with increasing accuracy. This result is forced on the
problem by the definition of the variable and would hold true even if the wage
differential had no theoretical influence on the participation decision.
The individual's choice of markets is based on comparisons of each of
these functions. The worker selects the market which yields the highest level
of discounted utility.13 This optimization process -is captured by the
following labor market indicator function.




Following the formulation in Lee (1982), define the following residual for
each individual and labor market.
(4) c. .= Max —T. .i=1,...,n Li kj 1 1) = 1,2,3,4
Substituting for I from (2) and for from (4) into (3) and rearranging
we obtain a reformulation of the labor market indicator function.
(5) I j1FF <Z.-y.i = 1,..
1
i= 1,2,3,4
The resulting likelihood function for this selection model depends on the
specific distribution of the residuals nt's. A straightforward estimation
problem exists if we assume that the nTs are independently and identically
distributed with the type I extreme value distribution with cumulative
distribution functions given by—11—
(6) <x)=exp[-exp(x)]
As demonstrated in Domenich and McFadden (1975), the implied cumulative







The selection problem, then, is analyzed with a multinomial log-it
model.14 In our application, the probability that individual i chooses labor
market j depends only on the characteristics of individual i. No market
specific characteristics have been included in the selection analysis at this
point in time. Estimation requires that we normalize the coefficients in one
market to equal zero. With no loss of generality we assume that =0.
Given the estimates from the multinomial logit, we can proceed to
estimate the wage equation in each market using the generalized two-stage
procedure discussed in Lee (1982). While it is possible to jointly estimate
all four wage equations, we chose instead to estimate each separately using
only observations on individuals who selected that market. Consistent
estimation, then, requires that we calculate the conditional expectation for
each wage equation.
(8) E(lnw,.I I.=j)= X..+E(u.t11=j)
=X.•.+ E(u.€..<Z..y)
133 13 1313 3
Thecase where u. and c. follow a bivariate normal distribution leads
13 13
tothe standard selection bias correction. A similar correction can be-12--
derived in our problem by transforming the cu's into a standard normal random




•= cumulativedistribution function for a standard normal variable
variable.
By construction, -N(O,1).In addition, we have the following
relationship.
(10) €..< Z.y.1FF c. <
Wecan substitute this inequality into the conditional expectation term in
equation (8). This gives us the following regression equation.
(11) E(lnw..t I.=j) =X...+E{U..c.<F.(Z.y.))}
This conditional expectation can be evaluated using standard methods.
(12) E(lnw.l Iii) =X..api
where
p. =correlationcoefficient between u. .and€*.
3 •1J 13
Consistentestimates for the 's can be obtained by replacing with our
first stage estimates y. This substitution implies that the standard errors—13—
for the 's reported by OLS will be biased since they do not account for the
sampling variability in the )f'S. The "corrected" variance/covar-lance
matrices can be derived following the methods discussed in Lee (1980)15
IV. DATA CONSIDERATIONS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this section we discuss the criteria used to generate our sample. We
also present the multinomial logit estimates, the wage equation estimates, and
the various wage differential estimates. The observations used in our
analysis were taken from the 1977 May CPS. Individuals were included in the
sample if they were in the nonagricultural sector, reported both a usual
weekly earnings and a usual weekly hours, were full—time labor force
participants, and lived in an SMSA. For individuals living in SMSA's for
which the BLS does not report cost—of-living budget data, we chose the budget
data for the nearest similar SMSA. Table Al in the appendix lists the SMSA's
included in the study as well as the corresponding budget data used for that
SMSA.
Finally, the CPS lists four "industry" classifications for public sector
employees: postal, other federal, state, and local. Using detailed
occupation data we were able to further disaggregate the local employees into
three categories: teachers, police & fire, and other local. However, these
classifications only account for 57.4 percent of the total number of
government workers. The remaining nonclassified government workers were
treated as the left out group in public sector wage equations.16
Turn now to the multinomial logit results from the labor market selection
process. We chose variables to include in the vector which we felt would-14--
be important in a long term decision over which labor market to participate
in. Based on this criteria, the current age of the individual was excluded
from the specification.'7 We conjectured that an individual's level of
education may be a key determinant of his/her market selection.18 For this
reason, we entered education as a disjointed spline function with break points
at high school and college graduation. This allows for more general education
effects than would be obtained simply by entering the level of education
in a linear fashion. Region dummy variables were also included in the
specification. These help to control for such diverse factors such as
regional variation in state laws affecting unions, etc.
The breakdown of the sample by labor market is given in Table A2 in the
Appendix. Table A3 contains the means and standard deviations for the
logistic variables. The logistic coefficient estimates are presented in
Table 1. For ease of interpretation, the implied marginal effect of each
variable on the probability of selecting each market is given in Table 2.'
Examining these marginal effects we find many interesting patterns. The
effect of being white -is to raise the probability of selecting the
private/nonunion sector by over 16 percent. Males have a 21 percent higher
probability than females of being in the private/union sector. Veterans are
more likely to work in the public sector with the reduction coming entirely
from the nonunion s-ide of the private sector. Living in the South or the West
reduces the likelihood of being in the private/union sector. These
individuals tend to work in either nonunion sector. This pattern is most
prominant in the South which may reflect the prevalence of right-to-work laws
in these states.2°—15—
We find that increased levels of education do not reduce the probability
of being in a union sector per se. Instead, large investments in education
discourage only selecting the private/union sector. For example, graduating
from high school reduces the probability of being in this sector by over 8.5
percent. In contrast, while graduating from college reduces the chance of
selecting the private/union sector by 3.2 percent it raises the chance of
selecting the public/union sector by 3.5 percent. Finally, finishing high
school as well as continuing schooling for the first year beyond high school
has a positive impact on the incidence of private/nonunion sector employment.
However, from the third year beyond high school, continued education
diminishes the probability of an individual selecting this sector.
The private and public sector wage equation estimates are given in Table
3 and Table 4. Both OLS and the consistent two-stage estimates are presented.
The standard errors for the two-stage estimates have been corrected to account
for both the sampling error in the logistic estimates as well as the
truncation of the distribution of the residual by the selection process.
Rather than deflating the nominal wage by the cost-of-living index (CLI), we
include the log CLI as a separate regressor.
Several things are worth noting about these estimates. The variances of
the distributions of the residuals are smaller for the union as compared to
the nonunion sectors. In addition, the R-squarets are smaller in the union
sectors. The returns to individual characteristics such as education and
experience are also lower in the union sectors.21 These findings are
consistent with the view that unions attempt to standardize wage structures.22
Evidence is also found suggesting that private sector union contracts also—16—
tend to standardize wages across regions. A one percent increase in the
metropolitan cost-of-living results in only a one third of a percent increase
in the nominal private/union sector wage. In contrast, the coefficients on
the log CLI in the other three sectors are all insignificantly different from
one.
The data also indicates that workers who select themselves into the
private/nonunion sector have a comparative advantage in that sector. Workers
who select themselves into the public/union sector, on the other hand, have a
comparative disadvantage in that sector. That is, these workers tend to earn
less than a worker with similar observable characteristics who is selected at
random from the population. Neither of these two selection effects is
measured with great precision.
One final point of interest concerning the wage equation estimates is the
comparison of the race coefficients across sectors. Smith (1977, pp. 108,
115) argued that affirmative action may be expected to have its strongest
impact in the public sector. The argument is that public sector jobs are
highly visible and that public sector agencies are charged with enforcing
affirmative action in the private sector. Borjas (1982) found support for
this hypothesis at the federal level of government. Using interagency data he
found that the extent of racial wage discrimination declined with the size of
the minority constituency of an agency as well as with the fraction of its
budget devoted to affirmative action compliance in the private sector.
Further evidence on this hypothesis is provided by our wage equation
estimates. In the public/nonunion sector we find no significant difference in
wages based on race. In the public/union sector whites on average earn 8.1—17—
percent more than nonwhites. While this latter difference is statistically
significant, it is still much lower in magnitude than the race coefficients in
the private sector.23
The various wage differentials calculated for this study are presented in
Tables 5 through 8.In each table, three types of differentials are reported.
The first uses the OLS wage equation estimates and are given for comparison
purpose. Two distinct differentials are calculated using the two—stage wage
equation estimates. Conditional differentials are listed as specification (2)
in each table. These include the selection effects when calculating the
expected wage. Unconditional differentials are listed as specification (3) in
each table. These exclude the selection effects when calculating the expected
wage. 24
The cbnditional and unconditional differentials have very different
interpretations. The aggregate public sector union differentials will
illustrate this distinction. The unconditioned differential corresponds to
the following experiment. Take at random from the population an individual
with observable characteristics which are the same as the average public
sector worker. Since we do not observe this individual's choice of sectors,
the union differential reflects only the varying returns for his/her
observable characteristics in the two public sectors. The conditional
differential corresponds to very different experiment. In this case, we
select at random a worker from the public/nonunion sector and a second worker
from the public/union sector each with the same observeable characteristics as
the average public sector worker. Since we know each individual's choice of
sectors, the differential reflects not only the varying returns on their-18--
observable characteristics but also the varying returns from their
unobservable characteristics which can be inferred from their market
selection.
Comparisons of the success of public and private sector unions at
generating wage differentials for their members are given in Table 5.The
public sector union differentials are calculated using the mean
characteristics of public sector workers for the specific category being
considered. The private sector union differentials were calculated in a
similar fashion.
Two patterns evident in this table will carry over to each of the other
sets of wage differentials. The first is that the OLS and the conditional
two-stage differentials have virtually the same point estimates and standard
errors. This is the direct consequence of the construction of the conditional
differentials. Estimating an individual's expected wage using OLS implicitly
includes any selection effect which may be present. The estimated expected
wages used to calculate the conditional differentials explicitly include these
same selection effects. Consequently, it is not surprising that the two
methods produce similar results.
The second common feature in these tables is that the unconditional
differentials are much greater in magnitude than the conditional
differentials. This is a consequence of the specific types of selection
effects found in this study and need not occur in general. To see this,
consider the public sector union differentials for a moment. Recall that the
public/nonunion workers have no significant comparative advantage or
disadvantage in their sector while the public/union workers have a comparative—19--
disadvantage. In calculating the conditional union different-ial, the expected
union wage -is reduced by the average comparative disadvantage of workers in
this sector. This acts to lower the resulting union wage differential .In
contrast, in calculating the unconditional union differential, the expected
union wage is not reduced by the average comparative disadvantage of union
workers. Consequently, the resulting union wage differential is much larger.
The same pattern occurs in the private sector union differentials because the
private/nonunion workers have a comparative advantage in their sector while
the private/union workers have no selection effect. The same reasoning
applies to the public/private sector wage differentials.
Turn now to the specific results in Table 5. Had we estimated the wage
equations using only OLS, then we would have concluded as Ehrenberg and
Schwarz do that public sector unions have been unable to generate sizeable
wage differentials. As it turns out, the point estimates for the
unconditional union differentials are much higher in the public as compared to
the private sector. This is an important finding if one believes that the
unconditional differential is the conceptually "correct" one to focus on.25
At issue is what type of experiment the wage differentials are meant to
represent. To reiterate our earlier point, the unconditional differentials
correspond to the experiment involving drawing at random from the population a
worker of a given set of observed characteristics and moving him/her between
labor market sectors. In this respect, the unconditional differentials
reflect purely the varying returns to a worker's observed characteristics
across these sectors.
The figures in Table 5 also point out several contrasting features of—20-
public and private sector unions. The regional breakdowns show that the
public sector union effects have been the strongest in the northeast and the
north central regions while the private sector union effects have been
strongest in the south and west.26 Private sector unions have increased wages
by a greater amount for nonwhites as compared to whites and for males as
compared to females. Exactly the opposite pattern is found in the case of
public sector unions.
In Table 6 we disaggregate the public sector union differentials by level
of government and region. Looking first at the aggregate numbers, we find
that unconditional differentials are roughly the same across federal, state,
and local levels of government. The conditional union differential for local
public workers is slightly higher than the corresponding federal or state
d-ifferent-ial.27 It is interesting to note that despite the exemption which
allows postal worker unions to bargain over wages, the union differential for
postal workers is not significantly higher than the differential for other
federal workers. Looking at the local level, the unconditional union
differentials are roughly the same for teachers, police and firemen, and other
local workers. In contrast, police and firemen have lower conditional
differentials than either teachers or other local workers.28 The regional
figures for each level of government follo the same basic pattern as noted in
Table 5.
Estimates for the public/private sector wage differentials are given in










k. fraction of workers in the ith sector.
1
Inwords, to calculate the expected public (private) sector wage for a
hypothetical worker with a given set of individual characteristics we assume
that his/her probability of being in the nonunion or union sector is equal to
the observed frequency of workers across those two sectors. The expected
wage, then, is the weighted average of the two conditional wages in each
public (private) sector.29 The mean individual characteristics used in these
calculations were for public sector workers. This was to facilitate
comparisons between Table 7 and Table 8. The sample of private sector workers
were used only to generate employment shares for the private sector and
industry frequency distributions.
The overall unconditional public/private sector differential is
estimated to be 1631 percent. The corresponding conchtional estimate is 3.80
percent. The differential is highest in the northeast region and lowest in
the north central region. The unconditional differential for nonwhites is
more than double the estimate for whites. In addition, the unconditional
differential for females is nearly twice the size of the male differential.
Whfle Smith (1981) does not report any comparable figures which pool all
government workers together, her estimated differentials for male and female—22-
federal workers are nearly identical to our overall estimates by sex.
Table 8 contains the breakdown of the public/private sector
differentials by level of government. This allows us to check to see if the
comparability legislation governing federal wages has resulted in lower
differentials than for state or local workers. In fact, both the conditional
and unconditional differentials are highest for federal workers. The
estimated federal unconditional differential is 28.92 percent as compared to
state and local estimates of 9.45 percent and 18.12 percent respectively.
This ordering is similar to Smith's findings for male workers. Unlike the
case of the union differentials, the public/private differential for postal
workers is more than twice that of other federal workers. Looking across the
classifications of local workers we see that police and firemen are paid the
highest relative to what they might earn in the private sector.3° The federal
differential is highest in the northeast and west. The same regional pattern
holds for state and local differentials.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we examined both public and private sector union wage
differentials as well as public/private sector wage differentials using data
drawn from the May 1977 CPS. A general selection model was estimated which
indicated that wages for private/nonunion and public/union workers were
affected by the selection process. Two conceptually distinct sets of
differentials calculated using the consistent wage coefficient estimates were
presented and contrasted. The general findings in the literature were—23—
consistent with our conditional differential estimates but not with our
unconditional estimates. In particular, the unconditional union differentials
were much higher in the public as compared to the private sector. Nonwhites
were found to have the largest public/private differential of all major
categories of workers considered. When we disaggregated by level of government
we found that federal workers enjoyed the largest advantage relative to what
they would earn in the private sector.
The results of this study suggest several possible directions for future
work in this topic area. The first concerns the list of variables included
both in the logit model and in the wage equations. These consisted
exclusively of individual characteristics, region dummy variables, and
industry and level of government classifications. No state or SMSA specific
variables apart from cost-of-living were explored. This is in contrast to the
approach taken in the studies based on contract level data. These studies
concentrate on state laws governing public unions, the form of local
government, etc. It would be interesting to integrate this type of data into
our analysis. A second possible topic is to determine whether or not the
magnitudes of state and local public/private differentials can explain the
adoption in some state of restrictive tax and/or budgetary measures. In
addition, we could investigate to what extent these types of legislative
measures result in lowering subsequent d'fferentials in that state. These
issues can be addressed by estimating this model for years prior to and
following the passage of these state laws.—24—
Footnotes
1.See Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983) for a survey of the public sector
labor market literature.
2.See for example the work by Smith (1981k. Two noteable exceptions are
Venti (1985) who allows for endogeneous choice of government status and
Robinson and Thomes who allow for endogeneous choice of union status. See
Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983) for a discussion of selection bias in the
contract based studies.
3.We used the natural log of the wage rate as our dependent variable. If
is the coefficient on the race dummy variable, then the implied percentage
wage difference can be calculated by 1OO(e-1). See Halvorsen and Palmquist
(1980).
4.The rationale given for this exception is that wage increases for these
categories of federal workers can be paid for out of charges for their
services. This is in contrast to other federal workers whose wages are paid
for out of general tax revenue.
5.For a detailed description of these state statues see Freeman and
Valletta (1985).
6.See Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983) for more discussion of these points.
7.Wages set under the Federal Wage System are also intended to reflect
private sector rates of compensation. In principal, the comparability
doctrine is intended to also apply to Postal workers who can bargain over
their wages.
8.See the President's Panel of Federal Compensation (1976).—25—
9.See Venti (1985, PP. 6—7) and Smith (1977) for more discussion of the
wage setting procss.
10. This is in sharp contrast to studies of union wage effects for
private sector employees. These studies concentrate instead on variation in
individual and industry characteristics rather than variations in legislative
environments. An exception is the work on the effect of right-to-work laws.
See Farber (1984).
11. These estimates are derived from the reported coefficients on the
government dummy variables for the specifications using the log real wage as
the dependent variable. These are reported in Table 1, pp. 91-92. The
percent differential is calculated as 100(e—1).
12. This tradition was started by the work of Lee (1978).
13. More generally, we observe an individual working in a particular sector
only if he/she both desires to be in that sector and can find employment in
that sector. Abowd and Farber (1982) augment the market choice functions with
firm employment decision functions. They reject the hypothesis that only the
market choice functions matter in determining a worker's union status. Given
the complexity of our multi-choice model, we have not followed their approach.
14. A summary of this method as well as a comparison to alternative
estimation approaches is given in Maddala (1983, pp. 275-278).
15. Details of these derivations are available upon request.
16. In contrast, Smith (1981) eliminates the nonclassified government
workers from her sample.
17. Age should be included only if there is systematic movement of
individuals between markets as they grow older. We tested for this life-cycle
effect but found no evidence of it in the data.-26-
18. An individual's level of education was defined to be the number of
completed years of schooling.
19. The noneducation marginal effects are evaluated using the sample means
for the noneducation variables and assuming that the individual graduated from
high school. The sample mean number of years of education was actually
slightly greater than twelve. The education marginal effects are evaluated
using the sample means of the noneducation variables.
20. See Farber (1985) for a detailed analysis of the effects of these laws.
21. The only exception is the experience profile for the public/union sector
which is slightly steeper than for the public-nonunion sector.
22. See Freeman (1982) for a discussion of this issue.
23. An alternative explanation is that the public sector attracts a more
homogeneous group of workers as a result of its standardized pay structure.
This implies that the race coefficient is less likely to be picking up
unmeasured productivity differences. Similar arguments would apply to unions
which also use standardized wage structures. However, notice that the race
coefficient in the private/union sector is both large and significant. In
addition, within the public sector, the race coefficient is larger in union
than nonunion jobs.
24. Standard errors for the estimated differentials are also reported. The
standard errors for the two—stage differentials include not only the variances
of the coefficients in each market but also the covariance between
coefficients in different markets which is induced by the first-stage logit
estimation.—27--
25. It should be stressed, though, that the estimates for the public sector
union differentials have very large standard errors associated with them. One
implication of this is that replicating our study on different years of the
CPS data might lead to cases with much lower estimates for these
differentials.
26. Recall that we found evidence of standardization of private sector union
wages across regions. This will tend to raise the estimated differentials in
low cost-of-living areas such as the south.
27. The figures for the state level of government should be interpreted with
caution. The data included few state workers since most state capitals are
not in the set of SMSA's included in the CPS data.
28. The OLS and conditional two—stage estimates for teachers are consistent
with the low end of the range of estimates reported by Baugh and Stone (1982).
29. An alternative approach -is to take the characteristics of the worker in
question and use them in conjuction with our logit model to predict the
probability that this worker would be in each sector. It should also be noted
that we did not include sampling variation in the employment shares or the
residual variance terms when calculating the standard errors for these wage
differentials. Had we opted to use the logistic probabilities in lieu of the
employment shares, it would have in principal been possible to include this
additional source of sampling variation.
30. This sizeable differential may reflect in large part compensation for the
inherent job hazards facing these workers. This illustrates the point that
this procedure for estimating wage differentials does not identify what-28-
portion consists of "rent extraction" versus compensation for varying job
attributes such as health risk.-29-
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Married —0.0889 0.0728 0.0002 0.0159
(0.0105) (0.0136) (0.0050) (0.0045)
White 0.1723 -0.0688 -0.0254 -0.0782
(0.0130) (0.0109) (0.0067) (0.0088)
Male -0.0899 0.1999 —0.0670 —0.0429
(0.0106) (0.0188) (0.0062) (0.0056)
Veteran -0.0861 —0.0131 0.0426 0.0566
(0.0112) (0.0096) (0.0070) (0.0071)
Junior -0.0026 —0.0040 0.0010 0.0055
(0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0018) (0.0027)
Senior 0.0511 -0.0870 0.0314 0.0044
(0.0153) (0.0130) (0.0065) (0.0075)
1st Yr. College 0.0659 -0.0430 0.0005 -0.0234
(0.0132) (0.0119) (0.0064) (0.0050)
2nd Yr. College 0.0163 -0.0643 0.0268 0.0212
(0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0012) (0.0009)
3rd Yr. College —0.0116 -0.0472 0.0308 0.0280
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0014)
4th Yr. College -0.0363 -0.0328 0.0336 0.0355
(0.0038) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0025)
1st Yr. Grad. —0.0560 -0.0218 0.0347 0.0431
(0.0047) (0.0013) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Northeast -0.0453 0.0424 —0.0405 0.0434
(0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0044) (0.0041)
Central -0.0738 0.1179 -0.0252 -0.0189
(0.0100) (0.0124) (0.0044) (0.0041)
South 0.1002 -0.1485 0.0762 —0.0279
(0.0102) (0.0089) (0.0068) (0.0042)
West -0.0157 -0.0064 0.0145 0.0076
(0.0102) (0.0097) (0.0050) (0.0047)










































































































































Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Thirty-six





























































































































State 0.0662 0.0659 0.0100 0.0136
(0.0453) (0.0450) (0.0466) (0.0482)Table 4 (Continued)
Var blia e Public/Nonunion Public/Union





































Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.Table 5: Public and Private Sector Union Wage Differentials
Public Sector Private Sector
Category OLS Two—Stage OLS Two-Stage
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Aggregate 3.07 3.68 31.18 14.23 14.18 18.56
(2.04) (2.18) (35.69) (i.31) (1.69) (5.82)
Region:
Northeast 9.19 9.86 37.30 7.00 6.46 11.06
(3.63) (3.91) (4L35) (1.76) (2.53) (5.57)
North Central 6.89 7.62 37.35 15.04 14.98 19.63
(3.27) (3.56) (39.23) (1.72) (2.63) (5.36)
South -3.63 -3.18 23.90 19.23 20.10 23.74
(2.90) (3.30) (30.88) (2.33) (3.23) (8.03)
West 2.75 3.29 29.58 18.53 18.33 22.66
(3.06) (3.47) (34.10) (2.03) (2.91) (6.69)
Race:
White 3.03 3.65 31.94 14.13 14.06 18.18
(2.13) (2.29) (36.57) (1.36) (1.77) (5.88)
Nonwhite 3.01 3.56 27.85 16.50 16.54 22.95
(3.45) (4.00) (32.41) (2.37) (3.53) (6.75)
Sex:
Male 1.31 2.00 29.79 13.04 12.93 17.89
(2.35) (2.53) (37.25) (1.38) (1.91) (5.15)
Female 4.43 4.89 31.82 10.64 10.67 13.84
(2.54) (2.86) (33.60) (1.78) (2.37) (7.17)











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 7: Public/Private Sector Wage Differentials
OLS Two-Stage Category
(1) (2) (3)
Aggregate 3.48 3.80 16.31
(1.22) (1.44) (13.78)
Region:
Northeast 5.25 5.55 22.70
(1.73) (2.14) (12.99)
North Central -1.45 -1.09 11.02
(1.72) (1.94) (13.77)
South 6.19 6.74 14.92
(1.95) (2.55) (14.96)
West 6.20 6.31 18.94
(1.86) (2.23) (13.64)
Race:
White 1.25 1.54 13.44
(1.24) (1.48) (13.89)
Nonwhite 13.45 13.94 28.48
(2.23) (2.74) (13.66)
Sex:
Male -0.51 —0.01 12.74
(1.33) (1.55) (13.72)
Female 10.06 10.10 22.48
(1.63) (2.09) (14.06)
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table Al: List of Cities Included in the Sample by Region


























































































*Table A2: Breakdo'rn of Sample by Labor Market
Nonunion Union
Private 8,232 2,989 11,221
Public: 1,464 1,222 2,686
Federal: 408 187 595
Postal 42 122 164
Other Federal 356 65 431
State: 84 39 123
Local: 321 503 824
Teachers 117 321 438
Police & Fire 70 102 172
Other Local 134 80 214
Non Classified 651 493 1,114
9,696 4,211 13,907Table A3: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Used in the Logit Analysis








West 0.2466 0.4310Table A4: Means and Standard Deviations of the Wage Equation Varibles
Private! Variable Nonunion
Private/
Union
Public!
Nonunion
Publ
Uni
id
on
Log Wage
Education
Experience
Experience2
Male
White
Married
Veteran
Professional
Log CLI
Northeast
South
West
Selection
Parameter
Postal
Other Federal
1 .6221
(0.5290)
12.8124
(2.8521)
17.1199
(13.3788)
472.0609
(608.6446)
0. 5776
(0. 4940)
0. 8938
(0. 3081)
0.7609
(0.4265)
0. 2430
(0. 4289)
0. 3216
(0.4671)
-0.0035
(0.0633)
0. 2511
(0. 4337)
0. 2418
(0.4282)
0.2208
(0.4148)
0. 6210
(0. 1659)
1. 8136
(0.3957)
11.2603
(2.6311)
22.0545
(13.8700)
678.7136
(685.6099)
0.7892
(0.4079)
0.8351
(0.3712)
0.8535
(0.3537)
0.3593
(0.4799)
0.0753
(0.2639)
0.0061
(0.0582)
0.2854
(0.4517)
0.1325
(0.3391)
0.2041
(0.4031)
1 . 1575
(0.3698)
1.7848
(0.5097)
14.0936
(2. 8284)
17.7356
(12.8620)
479.8723
(569.5679)
0. 5157
(0.4999)
0.8265
(0.3788)
0.7930
(0.4053)
0.2971
(0. 4572)
0.4720
(0. 4994)
-0. 0131
(0.0555)
0.1510
(0.3581)
0.3723
(0.4836)
0.2377
(0. 4258)
1 . 5872
(0.3429)
0.0287
(0.1670)
0 . 2500
(0.4332)
1. 8865
(0.3662)
13.9435
(2.9784)
20 .8633
(12 .8946)
601.4149
(624.5284)
0. 5876
(0.4925)
0.7766
(0.4167)
0.8355
(0.3709)
0.3625
(0. 4809)
0.4591
(0.4985)
0.0177
(0.0639)
0.3691
(0.4827)
0. 1522
(0.3594)
0.2398
(0.4271)
1.6899
(0.3302)
0.0998
(0.2999)
0.0532
(0.2245)